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Abstract. The article aims at demonstrating that in attributing the creatio ex nihilo to
both Plato and Aristotle as their unanimous philosophical conviction theTreatise on the
Harmony between the Two Sages deeply depends upon the Neoplatonic reading of those
two philosophers. The main obstacles for such a view in the works of the two sages are
Plato’s assumption of a precosmic chaos in the Timaeus and Aristotle’s denial of any
efficient causality to the unmoved mover in theMetaphysics. Both of these points had
been, however, done away with by the Neoplatonist commentators already, especially
by Ammonius in his lost treatise on efficient and final causality in Aristotle the use of
which in the Harmony is shown by a comparison with Simplicius. Christian and
Muslim readers just had to transfer those arguments and hermeneutical techniques
into an anti-eternalist context in order to make the two philosophers agree with one of
the basic tenents of their face, a hermeneutical technique considerably different from
the one employed by al-Fārābī in his exposition of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy
which is compared to the Harmony in a briefly sketched concluding section.
Résumé. L’article vise à montrer que le Traité sur l’harmonie des deux sages, en
attribuant la creatio ex nihilo à Platon et Aristote comme conviction philosophique
commune, dépend profondément de la lecture néoplatonicienne de ces deux philo-
sophes. Les obstacles principaux à une telle attribution dans les œuvres des deux
sages sont, dans le Timée de Platon, l’affirmation d’un chaos précosmique et, dans
la Métaphysique d’Aristote, la négation d’une causalité efficiente du premier moteur
immobile. L’interprétation néoplatonicienne avait toutefois éliminé chacune de ces
affirmations de la doctrine des deux maîtres, comme le montre en particulier le
traité d’Ammonius sur la causalité finale et efficiente chez Aristote. Or, on peut
montrer, par une comparaison avec Simplicius, que l’Harmonie faisait usage de ce
traité. Les philosophes chrétiens et musulmans avaient ainsi la possibilité d’employer
les mêmes arguments et méthodes herméneutiques pour établir une concordance
entre les deux principales autorités philosophiques d’une part et une de leurs plus
importantes convictions religieuses d’autre part – une herméneutique qui diffère
considérablement de la méthode appliquée par al-Fārābī dans sa propre exposition
des philosophies de Platon et d’Aristote, comme le montre, dans la conclusion de
l’article, la brève comparaison avec l’Harmonie.
The history of western philosophy, at least from antiquity to the
renaissance age, was a history of understanding, interpretating,
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misunderstanding and criticizing the two outstanding figures who
emerged shortly after its beginning and became almost canonical
classics shortly after their death: Plato and Aristotle. Their mutual
agreement or disagreement was not only a core-topic in the debates
between the many different philosophical schools of the Hellenistic
era, but was to become a crucial issue in defending the scientific char-
acter of philosophy as a whole from Antiochus of Ascalon onwards,1
especially in later Neoplatonism, when ‘pagan’ philosophical science
had to struggle against the intellectual and political attacks of the
Christian majority. How can the task represented by this tradition,
the rational quest for fundamental, metaphysical knowledge, seem
promising or even possible, if the two reference-figures at its very
beginning, Plato and Aristotle, are actually in disagreement with
each other on the most important relevant topics, like the nature of
the first principle, the relationship between soul and body or the
beginning of the world? This was the question equally to be faced by
the Greek philosophers of late antiquity and the Arabic ones of the
Middle ages, as we learn most prominently from texts like the one
this study is devoted to: the treatise On the Harmony between the
Two Sages,2 traditionally attributed to al-Fārābī.3 In this treatise,
the author starts off by attacking the quarrelsome masses and their
obsession for constructing logical, political, ethical, physical and
metaphysical differences between the two great sages,4 an obsession
which, as he tries to show throughout the entire text, is only based
on the lack of proper hermeneutics. This hermeneutics, as he
expounds later on, has to consist in a diligent, i.e. differentiated and
1 Cf. L. Fladerer, Antiochus v. Askalon: Hellenist und Humanist (Graz, 1996), pp. 43–8.
2 On the topic in Arabic philosophy as a whole cf. G. Endress, ‘La concordance entre Platon et
Aristote, l’Aristote arabe et l’émancipation de la philosophie en Islam médiéval’, in
B. Mojsisch and O. Pluta (eds.), Historia philosophiae medii aevi. Studien zur Geschichte
der Philosophie des Mittelalters (Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1991), pp. 237–57 and
C. D’Ancona, “The topic of ‘Harmony between Plato and Aristotle’: Some examples in
early Arabic philosophy’, in A. Speer and L. Wegener (eds.), Wissen über Grenzen.
Arabisches Wissen und lateinisches Mittelalter (Berlin/New York, 2006), pp. 379–405.
3 The best edition is the most recent one: al-Fārābī, L’armonia delle opinioni dei due sapienti,
il divino Platone e Aristotele, ed. C. Martini Bonadeo (Pisa, 2008). As this edition is far less
widespread yet than the earlier one by D. Mallet and F. Najjar (L’harmonie entre les
opinions de Platon et d’Aristote [Damascus, 1999]) the text will be quoted here in referring
to Najjar’s paragraph- and Bonadeo’s page-numbering. As to the issue of the authenticity of
the text, its most recent editor can, however, not be said to have resolved all the considerable
doubts raised by J. Lameer, Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogistics: Greek Theory and
Islamic Practice (Leiden 1994), pp. 30–9; M. Rashed, “Al-Fārābī’s lost treatise On
Changing Beings and the possibility of demonstration of the eternity of the world”, Arabic
Sciences and Philosophy, 18 (2008): 19–58; “On the authorship of the treatiseOn the harmo-
nization of the opinions of the two sages attributed to al-Fārābī”, Arabic Sciences and
Philosophy, 19 (2009): 43–82 (cf. esp. his reply to Endress and Bonadeo ibid., pp. 75–82)
and D. Janos, “Al-Fārābī, creation ex nihilo, and the cosmological doctrine of jam‛ and
jawābāt”, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 129 (2009): 1–17.
4 Harmony § 1 (36,5–37,2 B.).
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irenical, treatment of the most important authorities in a scientific
field: One educated and qualified mind outweighs any kind of uncriti-
cal and uneducated mass, no matter how numerous it may be. If,
however, two educated, critical and independent minds agree on a cer-
tain subject-matter, their can be no better proof for the truth of their
opinion.5 Themost valuable criterion of truth in philosophical matters
is thus, for our author, the consensus of the most outstanding philoso-
phical minds, Plato and Aristotle, which at the same time validates
the philosophical quest for knowledge as being not only possible,
but also fruitful and important.
Yet, even if this quest could actually yield valid and productive
results in every scientific field, what if in one or more of the two auth-
orities yielded a conclusion contrary to the religious law of Islam? This
possiblity is never touched by our author explicitly,6 although it
clearly lies behind his entire attempt to free the two philosophers
from any suspicion of this kind. As he claims right in the beginning,
the starting-point of the entire discussion he is about to enter was
the question of creation or eternity of the world,7 a question which
– at least according to the Neoplatonic philosophers of late antiquity
– was answered by both Plato and Aristotle unanimously in the latter
sense. In many educated Muslims this will of course have created the
impression that philosophical science was entirely irreconcilable with
revelation and thus had to be proven self-contradictory – a tradition
which was to culminate in Ghazzālī’s Tahāfut. In contrast, our author
tries to present Plato and Aristotle as having originated (natural) phi-
losophical science just in their unanimous discovery of the creatio ex
nihilo, which for the first time lifted human speculation about the
beginning of the world above the level of lore and myths, as those
still believed by the Jews and Zoroastrians, and provided a scientific
basis for it.8
Judged on the basis of modern historical research, our author thus
arrives at an outright reversal of the actual historical development:
An idea which had its roots in early Judaism9 (and was developed
into a doctrine by Christian apologists10) is denied to the Jews and
transferred to Plato and Aristotle, both of which explicitly denied it
5 Harmony § 4 (39,1–40,3 B.).
6 Cf. however his warnings regarding the difficulty and unavoidable ambiguity of religious
language (Harmony §§ 66f; 69,15–70,16 B.).
7 Harmony § 1 (36,5–8 B.): “As most people of our time are stimulated to argue about the cre-
ation of the world and its uncreatedness and affirm that there is a difference between the
two preceding and outstanding sages regarding their affirmation of a first beginning. . .”.
8 Harmony § 58 (66,1–67,3 B.).
9 The classical reference is 2 Maccabees 7:28: “I want you, child, to look at heaven and earth
and then, seeing all this, know that God created it out of nothing”.
10 Cf. G. May, Schöpfung aus dem Nichts. Die Entstehung der Lehre von der creatio ex nihilo
(Berlin, 1978).
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in affirming the eternity of matter. The attitude ascribed here to
the uneducated masses, that they are unable to imagine a thing
originating from nothing and perishing into nothing,11 is even expli-
citly argued for by Aristotle in De generatione et corruptione I 3
317b12 and was not to be combatted philosophically before John
Philoponus,13 who was in turn attacked by al-Fārābī for criticizing
Aristotle’s theory of sublunar elements and the (eternal) substance
of heaven.14
The purpose of the following examination is to show that this
stunning reversal is not merely due to a completely misguided desire
for harmony between theological and philosophical doctrines or
even to mere mistranslations, interpretative misunderstandings
and deceptions like accepting the De mundo or even the Theology
of Aristotle as authentical works, but has important roots in the
Neoplatonic interpretation of both Plato and Aristotle. If one
wants to read the creatio ex nihilo into Plato and Aristotle, there
are two contrary assertions of the two philosophers which have to
be reinterpreted before all others: Plato’s affirmation of a preexistent
chaos or chaotically moved matter in the Timaeus and Aristotle’s
wholesale denial of divine creative activity. Only because the
Neoplatonists had already dealt with both of them and interpreted
both philosophers as unanimously presenting a doctrine of eternal
creation, their Muslim disciple got the chance to ‘invert’ this har-
mony and understand both (in the case of Aristotle obviously with
a lot more interpretative violence) as in fact aiming at a creatio ex
nihilo. Our examination thus has to proceed in three steps, the
first two of which will have to document the Neoplatonists’ dealing
with the two aforesaid problems. In a third, final step we will have
to analyse the relevant passage in our treatise as to its debt to the
relevant Greek sources. Finally, we will have a look at al-Fārābī’s
doubtlessly authentic presentation of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philos-
ophy and give some thoughts to the question, how this might be
related to what we read in the Harmony.
11 Harmony § 61 (68,5–10).
12 The possibility that all things might be made “from nothing” is also rejected as evident
non-sense in the most prominent passage of the Metaphysics (XII,7 1072a20; XII,10
1075b14f).
13 Cf. De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum IX,8–17 (ed. H. Rabe [Leipzig, 1899; repr.
Hildesheim, 1984], pp. 338–80). For the influence of this treatise, which was translated
into Arabic in its entirety, on the Arabic discussion of the creation problem cf. H.A.
Davidson, “John Philoponus as a source of medieval Islamic and Jewish proofs of creation”,
Journal of the American Oriental Society, 89 (1969): 357–91.
14 Cf. M. Mahdi, “AlFarabi against Philoponus”, Journal of Near Eastern Studies, 26 (1967):
233–60.
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I. TIMAEUS WITHOUT CHAOS
Our author’s claim that Plato and Aristotle overcame the ancient
creation mythology predominant in other philosophical schools and
religions by their scientific account of creatio ex nihilo is all the
more astonishing, if one takes a look at the Timaeus and finds Plato
expounding a creation myth in many respects strongly reminiscent
of the one in book of Genesis or similar ancient oriental texts: In the
beginning of all three parts of his exposition, Plato’s creator god, the
Demiurge (artisan), first encounters a preexistent chaos and then
brings order and symmetry into it according to the principles of
reason in fashioning it after the intelligible paradigm (Tim 29e–30a;
52e–53c; 69a–c). Christian readers of the Timaeus had thus always
been criticizing Plato for a deficient knowledge of the creator, whom
he prudently acknowledges, yet denies his omnipotence by making
him depend on preexistent matter.15 For the Arabs, however, the
Timaeus was both accessible in Ibn al-Bit
˙
rīq’s translation (now
lost)16 and in Galen’s paraphrase, in which the mythological elements
of presentation have almost completely vanished.17 Instead, Galen
presents an interpretation, which for a Muslim reader must have
been at least as offensive as the Neoplatonist one, namely the reading
initiated most probably by Plutarch of Chaironeia: According to this
reading, the precosmic chaotic movement is caused by the ungener-
ated evil world-soul hypothetically introduced in Plato’s Laws (X
896e–897b), which the Demiurge afterwards transforms into the
generated, good and rational soul of our cosmos (Tim 34b–36d).18
This odd interpretation, which was fiercely rejected by later
Platonism, is stated in Galen’s paraphrase not only pretty unequivo-
cally, but also in a way which makes it very difficult for the reader
to distinguish between Plato’s text and Galen’s interpretation.19
Thus, our author could never have arrived at his picture of Plato in
relying on the primary sources available to him,20 but rather takes
15 Cf. e.g. Athanasius,De incarnatione II,3. On the Christian attempts of reading the creatio ex
nihilo into Plato cf. my Platon und Aristoteles in der Kosmologie des Proklos. Ein
Kommentar zu den 18 Argumenten für die Ewigkeit der Welt bei Johannes Philoponos
(Tübingen, 2009) (STAC 54), pp. 56–8.
16 Cf. G. Endress, “Die wissenschaftliche Literatur”, in W. Fischer (ed.), Grundriss der ara-
bischen Philologie, vol. III: Supplement (Wiesbaden, 1992), pp. 2–61, on p. 29.
17 Cf.Galeni compendium Timaei Platonis, ed. P. Kraus and R. Walzer (London, 1951) (Arabic
text and Latin translation). The passages corresponding to the aforementioned chaos-
descriptions would be Compendium IIde, VIIIb-IXd (which in its present state suffers of
several crucial lacunae) and XVIIa.
18 On this tradition of Timaeus-interpretation cf. M. Baltes, Die Weltentstehung des plato-
nischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten, vol. I (Leiden, 1976), pp. 38–69 and his
Der Platonismus in der Antike, vol. 5 (Stuttgart, 1998), Bst. 136f.
19 Cf. esp. Compendium IVab.
20 The reference to the teleogical expositions in the books on anatomy and “on the usefulness of
body-parts” (De usu partium) (Harmony § 59) clearly has in mind works of Galen, and the
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the Neoplatonic interpretation of the Timaeus as in many respects
unquestioned starting-point. In this interpretation, neither the pre-
cosmic chaos nor the diverse fashioning-acts of the Demiurge are to
be taken litterally, as this would entail the (metaphysically desas-
trous) priority of the chaos to the cosmos. Hence, already Proclus
dismisses Plutarch and his followers pretty quickly in stating:
The school of Porphyry and Jamblichus rebuke this opinion, because it
locates chaos before order, deficiency before perfection, mindlessness before
mind also in the universal dimension and thus commits blasphemy not only
against the (divine) cosmos, but also against the Demiurge himself, as it
completely abrogates either his good-shaped will or his creative power.
For, if both come together, the cosmos has to be created by him eternally.21
That unnatural chaotic movement cannot have priority before the
naturally ordered one, had already been pointed out by Aristotle,
mainly in De caelo III,2. If, as Plato says, the creation of the cosmos
is preceeded by an infinite time of chaotic material movement, there
is no way of maintaining the natural character of the present order:
As Plato admits the existence of elements before the cosmos (Tim
53ab; 69b), their movement has to be either natural or unnatural.
However, if it were natural, the masses of elements would make up
the same order as they do now, and there would be no need of a
demiurgic act of organization (De caelo III,2; 300b17–25). Yet, if it
were unnatural or forced, this claim would be self-contradictory, as
it would entail an eternal precosmic unnatural state without the
opposite natural one, which the Demiurge would have always been
about to establish (301a4–11). In short: Any kind of unnatural state
always presupposes the natural order, as it always consists in a
deviation from the established natural state. For Aristotle, this
entails not only that nothing unnatural can be eternal (as the precos-
mic chaotic movement would in some sense be, if it were ungener-
ated),22 but also that the natural order has to be eternal, if ‘natural’
is to be determined as the state a thing has always or at least most
of the time (Physics II,8 198a35f).
This metaphysics of nature was recognized by the Neoplatonists as
basically Platonic, which made it difficult for them to understand,
why Aristotle did not grant these obvious insights to his master and
reports on the Timaeus elsewhere (e.g. Harmony § 71) do not witness to a closer acquain-
tance with the dialogue.
21 In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, ed. E. Diehl, vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1903), 382,12–20 (French
translation in Proclus, Commentaire sur le Timée, trans. A.-J. Festugière, 5 vols. [Paris
1966–68]). The gist of this argument appears – in an ethical context – already in
Plotinus, Ennead III 2, 4,26–36.
22 Cf.De caelo II,3 286a17–19: “Nothing unnatural is eternal. For the unnnatural is later than
the natural, and the natural is a deviation from the natural in any kind of process.”
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accordingly interpret the Timaeus metaphorically, not as litterally
and superficially as he did. Yet, the metaphorical interpretation of
the Timaeus had been known already to Aristotle himself and had
been rejected by him on the following grounds:
If the generation in the world presented by Plato had to be under-
stood metaphorically, in the sense a geometrician “generates” an
eternal figure by constructing it in front of the pupils in order to
demonstrate step by step its eternal structure, there would be no
room for steps of contradictory content. The picture had to be the
same, no matter if painted step by step or projected simulaneously
as a whole. As Plato’s description, however, does contain such
steps of contradictory content, namely the descriptions of chaos and
order, it has to aim at a real process temporally mediating
between the two extremes which as simultaneous would be mutually
exclusive.23 In fact, this argument points to a crucial problem of the
metaphorical interpretation24: If the mythical narration of the
creation-process is in fact nothing but a description of an eternal
structure, does every narrative element equally represent an aspect
of this structure or are some to be considered mere ornaments or illus-
trations? Jamblichus was obviously urging the first possibility, when
he rejected a merely pedagogical interpretation of the processual
structure of the dialogue, as this might make also of the Demiurge
himself a replaceable means of demonstration.25 Regarding the
descriptions of chaos, however, the later Neoplatonists still seem to
have pursued a twofold strategy: In some contexts, Proclus clearly
makes of it a remaining aspect of the cosmic structure in identifying
it with the subterranean sediments of the four elements he
also finds described in the closing-myth of Plato’s Phaedo (109c;
111c–113c).26 This explanation, however, does not cover the descrip-
tions in their entirety and in all their aspects: Especially the phrase
Tim 53b2f, where Plato remarks that in the precosmic state every-
thing was “exactly as it should be like, when God is absent from
something”, brought him to believe the chaos-descriptions to be basi-
cally thought-experiments, abstractions illustrating the present order
ex negativo. In the eighteenth argument refuted by Philoponus he
23 De caelo I, 10 (279a33–280a11) = Baltes, Platonismus V, Bst. 136.0b (German translation
and commentary).
24 The fact that Timaeus-description cannot be interpreted as a temporal process, is also
acknowledged by modern research: M. Baltes, “Γέγονεν (Platon, Tim 28b7). Ist die Welt
real entstanden oder nicht?”, in K.A. Algra (ed.), Polyhistor. Studies in the History and
Historiography of Ancient Philosophy: Presented to Jaap Mansfeld on his Sixtieth
Birthday (Leiden, 1996), pp. 76–96.
25 Cf. Baltes, Weltentstehung I, 170f.
26 Cf. my Platon und Aristoteles in der Kosmologie des Proklos, pp. 404–7.
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describes it as a Plato’s “divine contrivance” to describe a chaotic
world per absurdum as absence of God:
And this I would truly call a divine contrivance of Plato’s wisdom, which
proves the ungeneratedness of the cosmos together with its imperishability
from God’s eternal effectivity, to identify the reason of order and chaos in
the cosmos as God’s presence and absence. For if this alone can be the reason
for order and chaos on the side of the cosmos, but has no correspondence
in reality, as God can impossibly behave differently at different times, it is
also impossible to see order and chaos in the cosmos. If God always behaves
identically, he is not persent to the cosmos at one point and absent at
another. If he is not present at one point and absent at another, the cosmos
is also not in order at one point and in chaos at another, as only the presence
of God caused the order for the cosmos and only his absence chaos.27
This means, however, that for Proclus Plato’s descriptions of precos-
mic chaos in the end rather expound the impossiblity of such a chaos,
as it could only come true in the impossible case of the Demiurge him-
self being absent from his creation. Thus, Plato’s chaos has become as
“inexistent”28 as it needs to be to prepare for reading the creatio ex
nihilo into the great Greek philosopher.
Although this text is not explicitly referred to in theHarmony it was
very widespread and popular in contemporary philosophical circles,29
as can be shown especially from al-ʿĀmirī’s Book on the Afterlife. In a
passage thoroughly analyzed by C. D’Ancona,30 al-ʿĀmirī expounds a
solution of the classical problem of Timaeus-exegesis, i.e. how the
cosmos or, more specifically, the world-sould, can be called both gen-
erated and ungenerated by Plato, which basically goes back to the
one proposed by Porphyry: As (1) “generated” has to be understood
in the sense of “composed from matter and form”, (2) form has to be
simultaneous with matter and (3) both were created by the demiurge,
the latter has to create the world all in all from nothing within
no time. This argument perfectly elucidates how the Neoplatonic tra-
dition was dealt with in Arabic anti-eternalist philosophical circles:
Proposition (1)–(3) are all thoroughly Neoplatonic, (1) being probably
borrowed from Philoponus’ report on Porphyry in his refutation of
Proclus’ sixth argument,31 (2) and (3) stemming from argument
eleven and twelve and three and fourteen respectively. Yet, as soon
as the “creation” from proposition (3) is no longer understood in
27 Philoponus, De aeternitate XVIII (ed. Rabe, 607,6–20). Cf. my commentary on the text in
Platon und Aristoteles in der Kosmologie des Proklos, pp. 457–64.
28 In the text quoted above, Proclus calls God’s absence (and following presence) whithout
“correspondence in reality” or “inexistent” (anhypostatos; 607,13) and thus of course also
the precosmic chaos caused by it.
29 Cf. e.g. Davidson, “John Philoponus”.
30 “The topic of ‘Harmony’”, pp. 391–8.
31 De aeternitate mundi VI,8 (ed. Rabe, 144,16–149,26).
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emanationist, but in theistic terms, the conclusion drawn from that is
exactly the opposite one.
II. THE UNMOVED MOVER AS A CREATOR
In the preserved corpus, Aristotle never explicitly attacks the concept
of a creator-God in general or the Platonic demiurge in particular,
except maybe in one famous passage from the Metaphysics, where
he criticisizes Plato’s doctrine of ideas:
To claim that the ideas are paradigms and that all other things participate in
them, is to speak nonsense and to talk in poetical metaphors. For what is it
that creates looking up at the ideas?! (I,9; 991a20–22)
As the latter phrase is strongly reminiscent of Plato’s description of
the Demiurge (cf. Tim 28a–29a; 39e), Aristotle might interpret the
Demiurge here as mere poetical metaphor for the creative power of
the paradigm or the ideas, an interpretation also taken up by modern
research.32 However Aristotle may have understood Plato’s creator,
he did attack the general concept of a creator-god in his lost treatise
De philosophia,33 which also contained very important physical
arguments for the eternity of the world.34 This explains, why in the
relevant passages of the preserved lectures (esp. Physics VIII, De
caelo I,10–II,1, Metaphysics XII,6–10) he is so short on many impor-
tant aspects of the topic (Physics and Metaphysics limit themselves
to the eternity of time and movement, the De caelo-passage primarily
wants to prove the impossibility of a generated, yet unperishable
world, as posited – in Aristotle’s eyes – by Plato), as he presupposes
a familiarity with his arguments in the aforesaid treatise. Of course,
this also explains – at least partly – later attempts to read the idea
of creation into his texts, be it temporal as in the case of our author,
or be it eternal as in the case of the Neoplatonists.
That those were – despite this crucial difference – an important
source for our author’s (mis-)reading, is – contrary to the case of
eleminating precosmic chaos from Plato – made explicit by the
Muslim philosopher: Next to the Arabic Theology of Aristotle he refers
to a treatise of Ammonius, son of Hermeias, head of the Alexandrian
school in the first decades of the sixth century. Ammonius, he says,
wrote a monograph on the sayings of the two sages concerning the
affirmation of the creator, which is yet too well known to draw upon
32 Cf. e.g. A.J. Festugière, La révélation d’Hermès Trismégiste, vol. 2: Le Dieu cosmique (Paris,
1949), pp. 145–9.
33 Cf. B. Effe, Studien zur Kosmologie und Theologie der Aristotelischen Schrift “Über die
Philosophie”, Zetemata 50 (München, 1970), pp. 23–31 (mainly on the famous frg. 22 Rose
[= Cicero, Lucullus 119] and some parallels).
34 Cf. my Platon und Aristoteles in der Kosmologie des Proklos, pp. 262–73.
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it any further.35 Unfortunately, to the knowledge of our times this
monograph is lost and we can get only a vague idea of its contents
from a few references in the Aristotelian commentaries of
Simplicius, one of Ammonius’ disciples.36 In the most extensive report
in the commentary on Physics VIII,10, Simplicius presents the follow-
ing of Ammonius’ arguments: First of all, Ammonius seems to have
shown that also the Platonic demiurge fulfills the most important
Aristotelian criteria for the first cosmological principle: He is both
to be regarded as a final cause, as he does everything for the sake of
the good thus structuring the universe teleologically (cf. esp. Tim
29e–30b), and remains immobile, as he delivers the creation of perish-
able things to the young gods while “abiding in his own proper and
wonted state” himself (Tim 41a–42e). Thus, just as in Aristotle, the
unmoved mover or Demiurge is to be regarded as immediate cause
only regarding the translunar, imperishable realm while causing
the sublunar, perishable realm through the mediation of the stars.37
The following proof, that Aristotle conceived his final cause as an
efficient cause as well, is of course more complicated and at first
sight seems to be rather a collection of questionable dicta probantia:
Aristotle calls the efficient cause “principle of movement” (Physics
II,3; 194b29–32), he has God or nature “do nothing in vain” (De
caelo I,4; 271a33),38 he calls being and life of all things dependent
on the divine Aeon (De caelo I,9; 279a27–30), he reduces everything
to the two causes of moving-principle and matter (De generatione et
corruptione I,3 318a1–5) and thus has to assign the (efficient) creation
of movement (according to the respective forms) to the former, and
finally, just as Plato in the Phaedo (97b–98b), he praises Anaxagoras
for having introduced the intellect as the principle of the entire
natural order and movement (Metaphysics I,3; 984b15–22).39
In all those passages, however, Aristotle speaks of the intellect or
unmoved mover as imparting order and movement on the universe,40
not as creating its substance. Hence, Ammonius’ argument would be
rather weak, if he actually intended to conceal this difference just
35 Harmony § 58 (66,1–67,3 B.).
36 Cf. In Aristotelis de caelo commentaria, ed. J.L. Heiberg (Berlin, 1894) (CAGVII), 271,13–21
and In Aristotelis Physicorum libros VIII commentaria, ed. H. Diels, vol. 2 (Berlin, 1895)
(CAG X), 1360,24–1363,24. On the background cf. the comments of K. Verrycken, “The
metaphysics of Ammonius son of Hermeias”, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed.
The Ancient Commentators and their Influence (Ithaca, 1990), pp. 199–231, on pp. 216–25.
37 CAG X, 1360,31–1361,11.
38 Aristotle’s famous teleological principle: Politics I,1,9 1253a9; De caelo II,11 291b13f; De
generatione animalium 741b4f; De incessu animalium 711a18; De partibus animalium
658a8f and 695b19; De respiratione 486a12f.
39 CAG X, 1361,11–1362,10.
40 De caelo I,9 cannot really count as an exception, as this passage merely explains the mean-
ing of the term “Aeon” as “lifetime”, and the dependence of someone’s being on his lifetime
can of course not really be called an efficient-causal one.
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by pointing to the terminology of the Physics-passage adduced in
the first place, where the efficient cause is called principle of move-
ment. The next paragraph of Simplicius’ report seems, however, to
dwell exactly on this point: Against Alexander’s of Aphrodisias and
other commentators’ emphasis on the merely teleological causality
of the unmoved mover, Ammonius quoted, according to Simplicius,
Alexander’s commentary on De generatione I,3 318a1–5, where the
unmoved mover was called “efficient cause of the ungenerated move-
ment of the divine (heavenly) body” – for a Peripatetic philosopher a
very important concession, as this allows for a (temporally) ungener-
ated thing to nevertheless have an efficient cause. Afterwards, he dis-
cusses Physics II,6 198a2–13, where Aristotle argues that the
universe cannot have been created by chance, as chance is only the
cause of something per accidens, whereas intellect and nature are
causes per se. This argumentation, as Ammonius (or Simplicius)
admits, is merely hypothetical. However, just as most of the other pas-
sages mentioned above, it becomes relevant, if one takes into account
one important point. And this important point, finally, is the meta-
physical argument the entire Neoplatonic reading of Aristotle
depends upon:
Yet, one has to take into account that everything which is moved by some-
thing else also has to receive its existence from elsewhere, as substance is
more than movement. If, according to Aristotle, the power of every limited
body is itself limited, the power to move just like the power to sustain its
own substance, it is necessary that, just as it gets eternal movement from
the unmoved cause, it receives also its eternal corporeal substance from
the incorporeal cause.41
To conclude his report, Simplicius makes a remark on why Aristotle
was so reluctant to call his first principle efficent cause: He feared that
efficient causality might be too closely associated with the production
of temporal individuals and thus endanger the belief in the eternity of
heaven and universe. Thus, he distinghuishes between genesis (gener-
ation, becoming) and kinēsis (movement, processuality) only for peda-
gogical reasons, although in fact both terms mean practically one and
the same thing.42
Hence, according to the Neoplatonists, the movement of a corporeal
thing is not only with regard to its causation inseparable from its
essence, but its movement and essence are practically identical, as a
corporeal thing “has its being in its becoming”. This claim not only
reflects the wide semantic range of the Greek terms genesis and
41 CAG X, 1363,2–8. On the importance of the principle that no limited body can have unlim-
ited power (proved by Aristotle in the beginning of Physics VIII,10) cf. my Platon und
Aristoteles in der Kosmologie des Proklos, pp. 203–28.
42 CAG X, 1363,12–24.
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kinēsis signifying almost any kind of processuality, but also an impor-
tant piece of Platonic metaphysics which Aristotle had not been able
to get rid of completely. In the Platonic idea, efficient, formal or para-
digmatic and final causality necessarily coincide, as the idea in its
absolute determination and identity creates its images just by
being, what it is, as the undetermined matter strives for and tries to
imitate being and identity, thus receiving a form wherever it proves
to be fit. Thus, the reign of ideas, identity or being has to be clearly
distinguished from the reign of extended, self-alienated material
beings or becoming (cf. Tim 27d–28a). Material ‘being’ never really
is, i.e. fully determined and always self-identical essence, but has its
being in becoming or trying to become true being always emulating
the idea and striving for it. What Aristotle tried to do, was to formalize
this strive in that material beings for him are determinated in essence
by their immanent formal cause (not by a transcendent idea), but still
strive for the actualization of this essence in exercizing the processes
natural to them, thus emulating the perfect actuality of the unmoved
mover. However, if those essences only become actual in their natural
processes triggered by the emulation of the unmoved mover, the
Neoplatonists understandably saw a twofold problem to be resolved
by a single Platonic solution: Firstly, if every natural essence necess-
arily realizes itself in different processes, is the distinction between
essence and process really tenable and would not the one triggering
the process also have to be made responsible for the essence?
Secondly, if the different natural essences do not depend in any way
on the unmoved mover, why do they strive for his actuality? Does
not any strive presuppose a fundamental kinship, so that potentiality
only strives for actuality, if it had not only its aim, but also its origin in
the latter? Supposed, however, the movement Aristotle’s unmoved
mover and his diverse sphere-movers (cf. Metaphysics XII,8) trigger,
is not strictly to be distinguished from the essence of material beings,
but rather constitutes it, both problems would immediately be solved,
as their causality would then be very similar, if not identical with that
of a Platonic idea.43
Thus, the Neoplatonists had at least shown with pretty convincing
arguments that Aristotle had not been able to get rid of the metaphys-
ical concept of creation completely. At any rate, for a late antique
reader of Aristotle they made it very questionable, if not almost
impossible that Aristotle’s first principle was intended to be the
final cause of the universe exclusively. However, if this creation
should be understood not in the Platonic (eternally-paradigmatic),
43 How those ideas were developed at first to defend Plato against Aristotle’s criticisms and
then to harmonize the two philosophers completely, I tried to show in my Platon und
Aristoteles in der Kosmologie des Proklos, esp. pp. 27–30 and 214–19.
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but in a muslim, theistic way, their arguments were anything but
simple to adapt, which will have been the real reason, why our author
for elaborating his creationist picture of Aristotle rather appealed to
the Arabic Theology than to the alledgedly so well-known treatise of
Ammonius.
III. THE CREATIONIST SYNTHESIS PROPOSED IN THE HARMONY
Our author’s most important source for his harmonization of Plato
and Aristotle with respect to the problems of creation, ideas and the
relationship between intellect, nature and soul is obviously the
so-called Theology of Aristotle, the inauthenticity of which he actually
considers, yet rejects on the ground’s of the book’s widely accepted
reputation.44 The utilization of this and other related documents is,
however, beyond the scope of the present study.45 What has to be
examined here, is our author’s reading of the authentic Aristotelian
text and its possible Neoplatonic background. That this background
is of major importance for the interpretation proposed in our text,
might be doubted considering the fact that he is aiming at the
conclusion exactly opposite to the Neoplatonist one: The world does
no longer have to be eternal according to both Plato and Aristotle,
but has to be created from pure nothingness. Let us take a closer
look at the relevant paragraph of the treatise (§§ 53–76) in order to
judge, whether this supposition is actually justified. This paragraph
can be divided into three subsections: The first one (§§ 54–57) deals
with several Aristotelian texts on ungeneratedness and ‘creation’ of
the world, tries to show, how they can be understood as not stating
the eternity of the world and finally culminates in the aforesaid
reference to Ammonius’ treatise on the creator-God in Aristotle.
The second one (§§ 58–62) discusses the relationship between philo-
sophical proof and religious belief, the harmony of which has to be
shown before introducing the most important issue in harmonizing
Plato and Aristotle: the theologically suspicious doctrine of ideas
and the intelligible world (§§ 63–76).
As for the present study, I will restrict myself basically to a detailed
analysis of the Neoplatonic background of the first part, as it provides
more than enough material to illustrate the way in which our author
depends on the Neoplatonists. In this first part, we can distinguish a
negative (§§ 54f) and a positive section (§ 57), the first one dealing
basically with two texts allegedly arguing for the eternity of the
world (Topics I,11; De caelo I,10–II,1) and the second one referring
44 Harmony § 66 (70,5f B.).
45 For “creation” in the theology of Aristotle cf. P. Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus. A
Philosophical Study of the Theology of Aristotle (London, 2002), pp. 137–55.
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the reader to the Aristotelian Physics and Metaphysics (combined
with the Theology of Aristotle) which are claimed to witness clearly
to his belief in a creator.
At first sight, the negative part seems to be more than disappoint-
ing, as its treatment of the relevant Aristotelian texts is not only very
selective,46 but apparently relies on pretty weak arguments,
especially at the outset: Our author claims that readers of
Aristotle’s text were misled into ascribing to him the denial of a crea-
tor by a passage from the Topics (I,11; 104b1–17), where he presents
the problem, whether the world is eternal or not, as a dialectical one,
concerning which wise men bring forth syllogisms for both alterna-
tives. Obviously, the only possible misunderstanding this passage
might have caused in Aristotle’s readers would be that he regards
the problem in question as theoretically unsolvable, not that he solved
it in favour of the world’s eternity. Thus, in my opinion, this passage is
only adduced as an example for the hermeneutical method hewants to
have applied also to those Aristotelian texts really stating the eternity
of the world: He emphasizes that the purpose of the Topics is merely
logical and that the eternity-problem comes in only as an example for
the discussions of his time.47 As will finally become clear in the con-
clusion, when we will turn to al-Fārābī’s systematic exposition of
Aristotle’s philosophy, the emphasis on the systematic angle to be pre-
supposed in a certain text of the Aristotelian corpus is a sign for a cer-
tain kind of hermeneutical strategy developped exactly within the
attempt of harmonizing the two classical philosophical authorities.
Yet, as the Harmony works rather piecemeal advancing different
arguments against the eternalist reading of different Aristotelian
texts, those strategies are not as evident as in al-Fārābī’s doubtlessly
authentic treatment of the matter.
As a second text, which will have misled Aristotle’s readers, the
author refers to the De caelo et mundo, which clearly states the unge-
neratedness of the cosmos.48 In full accord with the Neoplatonists, our
author takes this as the denial of a beginning in time (archē
chronikē, bad’un zamāniyyun), as it denies the possiblity that the
world could have been generated in the course of a temporal process.
Yet, against the Neoplatonists, he argues that, if time is for Aristotle
nothing but an attribute of heavenly movement (cf. esp. Physics
46 The – next to the De caelo-passage – most important texts from the Physics (esp. book VIII)
and the Metaphysics (esp. book XII) are referred to only in the positive section, whereas
many other passages form De generatione and corruptione or the Meteorology are not men-
tioned at all (on those cf. F. Solmsen, Aristotle’s System of the Physical World. A Comparison
with his Predecessors [Ithaca, 1960], pp. 420–39).
47 Harmony § 54 (63,1–15 B.). For al-Fārābī’s treatment of this passage cf. Rashed,
“Al-Fārābī’s lost treatise On Changing Beings”, pp. 25–9.
48 Cf. esp. De caelo I,10–II,1 (cf. Ps-Aristotle, De mundo 4; 396a30–32).
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IV,11),49 there cannot be time before the heavenly movement of our
cosmos actually existed, i.e. the heavens themselves cannot have
been constructed in time. This simultaneity of time and heaven
was, however, explicitly stated already by Plato (Tim 38b), who was
harshly criticized by his pupil Aristotle exactly for this claim: If
Plato, according to Aristotle, wants the heavens both to be generated
by the Demiurge and to come into existence simultaneously with
time, he involves himself into the absurdity of postulating a gener-
ated, non-eternal time, which would allow for a period (of time) before
and after time (Physics VIII,1; 251a8–b10). Yet, as the Neoplatonists’
example shows,50 those premises could also yield the exactly opposite
conclusion: As Plato clearly emphasizes the simultaneity of time and
heaven, and time obviously has to be conceived of as eternal, he can-
not have intended his generation-process as a temporal (or punctual
act), but only as an eternal one. In contrast, for our author, neither
Plato nor Aristotle can have regarded time as eternal, as especially
Aristotle makes it depend upon the movement of heaven. Although
this reversal of the argument most probably goes back to Christian
predecessors, especially John Philoponus,51 its Platonic background
is still obvious: In Tim 38c–39d the Platonists read that the stars
were created, not only in order to measure time (39bc), but in order
to generate it (38c). Thus, if time is eternal, yet created by the stars,
those have to be eternal a fortiori.52
Even with all the exegetical traditions in their back those argu-
ments remain pretty weak. This is probably why our author in his
transition to the positive section hints at the necessity of taking a
different angle on Aristotle’s relevant expositions in the physical
writings: First of all, we have to consider his sayings about
rubūbiyya, the Arabic translation for the Greek ‘theology’,53 i.e.
mainly the clear statement of the creatio ex nihilo in the Theology of
Aristotle, if we want to interpet the physical writings correctly.
Afterwards, he presents a concise cento of references to several
49 Harmony § 55 (63,18 B.: “in this book [i.e. De caelo] and others of his physical andmetaphys-
ical books”) refers more exactly to De caelo I,9 (279a14f), Physics IV,11 (219b1f a.e.), De
generatione II,10 337a24f, and possibly to Metaphysics XII,5 (1071b9f).
50 Cf. e.g. Proclus’ fifth argument in Philoponus and my extensive commentary in Platon und
Aristoteles in der Kosmologie des Proklos, pp. 160–80.
51 Cf. De aeternitate mundi V,3 (ed. Rabe, 109,27–111,18) (for an English translation cf. John
Philoponus, Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World 1–5, trans. by J.M. Share [London,
2004]); Contra Aristotelem frg. 121Wildberg (Against Aristotle: On the Eternity of the World,
trans. by C. Wildberg [London / Ithaca 1987]).
52 Cf. the anti-stoic argument in Philo of Alexandria, De aeternitate mundi, ed. R. Arnaldez,
J. Pouilloux (Paris, 1969), §§ 52f.
53 Cf. e.g. the titles of the Proclus-translation in the manuscripts, which all explain uthūlūjiyā
as rubūbiyya (G. Endress, Proclus Arabus. Zwanzig Abschnitte aus der Institutio theologica
in arabischer Übersetzung [Wiesbaden, 1973], p. 3).
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Aristotelian and Platonic texts which has to be quoted in full in order
to evaluate its possible implications:
AndAristotlemakes clear in the lectures onPhysics that the generation of the
universe was not possible by chance or coincidence, a claim he also makes
concerning the world as a whole in the book on heaven and world in referring
to the admirable order which is to be found among the different parts of the
world as his proof for that. There, he also explains the issue of causes, how
many there are, and lists the efficient causes. As well, he explains there the
issue of the generator and mover, that he is ungenerated and unmoved, just
as Plato in his book known as Timaeus makes clear that every generated
thing is only brought into existence by a cause generating it necessarily
and that the generated thing is not the cause of his own generation.54
At first sight, this passage seems very general and unprecise in its
argumentation. If we suppose, however, a knowledge of Ammonius’
treatise in our author and his readers (cf. the table at the end of the
article), the case he presents becomes much more complex: Just like
Ammonius, he refers to Aristotle’s treatment of chance (tychē) and
coincidence (automaton) as possible physical principles in Physics
II,4–6,55 just like Ammonius, he refers to the basics of the four-causes
theory in Physics II,3, and again just like Ammonius, he refers to the
unmoved principle of movement from Physics VIII. As we have seen in
analyzing the Greek testimonies on Ammonius, all those passages can
only serve as evidence for a creator in Aristotle, if one accepts the
Neoplatonic parallelization or in a certain respect even identification
of movement and generation. Thus, the outright identification of the
mover and the generator can only be understood from an acquain-
tance with Ammonius’ treatise. Moreover, the Timaeus-quotation he
adduces (28a) points exactly into the same direction: Immediately
before his report on Ammonius’ treatise Simplicius parallelizes the
line of argument in Physics VIII,10 with the one in Tim 27d–28c in
a manner which might prove very elucidating for our author’s short
remarks: Just as Aristotle makes clear the insufficiency of the corpor-
eal world for sustaining an eternal movement (“no unlimited power in
a limited body”56) and thus posits an eternal incorporeal and unmoved
principle which has to sustain it, Plato starts with the deficiency of the
world of becoming (27d–28a), which cannot be self-sufficient and is
thus with absolute necessity dependent upon an eternal cause:
54 Harmony § 56 (64,7–65,17).
55 In 63,11ff our author adds a reference to the De caelo et mundo which much better fits the
Ps-Aristotelian De mundo, where the harmony (and imperishability) of the cosmos as a
whole (in contrast to the possibly chaotic and perishable state of its parts) is emphasized
in ch. 5 and its origin in divine providence described in the very theistic ch. 6. In the De
caelo, the cosmic order figures only as a proof for the eternity of the world, not for its depen-
dence on a first cause or creator (cf. esp. III,2 301a4–20 and I,10 280a12–24).
56 Cf. ab. n. 41.
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The entire corporeal realm, as it is extended by substance and by this exten-
sion of being subject to time and change, Plato ranks as generated and having
its being in becoming and because of this dependent on a cause as unable to
subsist by itself (authypostaton). ‘For everything, he says, it is impossible,
to undergo its generation without the cause’ [Tim 28a]. [. . .] Thus, he found
the Demiurge of the cosmos, a noeric god, who truly is and always behaves
identical as established in the Aeon, in proceeding from the mutable
substance of the world up to the the immutable cause. Aristotle as well
proceeded from motion and change and the extended and limited corporeal
entities up to the unmoved, immutable and unextended cause. For he showed
that themovement in reality has to be eternal and thus also the realitymoved,
as movement inheres in the moved reality. Yet, he also showed that every
moved reality is moved by something else and that the primarily moving
reality has to be an immobile and immutable cause for the things moved in
immediate proximity to eternal motion. That the Platonic becoming (genesis)
and the Aristotelian movement (kinēsis) both signify change, can easily
be learned from Plato’s distinction between identical and immutable being
and becoming as mutable and from the fact that Aristotle, when he claims
that every moved reality is moved by something else, does not talk
about the properly moved things only, but also about things coming to be
and perishing and in general about changing things. Formany times he called
the immobile cause immutable, as it does not transcend only the proper
movement, but also coming-to-be and perishing.57
This passage might help to understand the seemingly superfluous
remark inserted into the Timaeus-text that “the generated thing is
not the cause of the generation of its own self”: This remark might
take up a key term from the Neoplatonic argumentation just quoted,
namely the term authypostatos, self-subsisting. In this case, the state-
ment about the mover and generator in the Physics and the Timaeus
can in fact be regarded as a harshly abbreviated version of the argu-
mentation quoted from Simplicius, which most probably appeared
in a similar form also in the relevant treatise of Simplicius’ teacher
Ammonius. Thus, the only thing our author needed to do in order to
bring Physics and Timaeus into creationist harmony, was to suppress
the very first step of Aristotle’s resp. Simplicius’ argument, the eter-
nal nature of (time and) movement.
In contrast, his subsequent treatment of Metaphysics XII is much
more complicated, perhaps because he did not have similar
Neoplatonic comments on the passage available.58 He treats this
57 In Phys., CAG X, 1359,14–38. For the Demiurge as a “noeric god” cf. my Platon und
Aristoteles in der Kosmologie des Proklos, pp. 102–12.
58 In his treatise on the scope of the Metaphysics, al-Fārābī complains that there is no
all-encompassing commentary on the work available, only an incomplete one of
Alexander and one of Themistius on the entire book XII (Alfarabis philosophische
Abhandlungen aus Londoner, Leidener und Berliner Handschriften, ed. F. Dieterici,
[Leiden, 1890], p. 34).
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book from the Metaphysics as if it succeded the establishment of cer-
tain “propositions” (muqaddimāt) Aristotle is said to have established
in his theology, namely:
1 “that the one is present in every multitude”
2 “what contains the one in this world, is only one in such and such
a respect, and if it is not truly one, but every one is just present
in it, the one is different from it, and it is different from the one”
3 “the true one is that which emanates oneness on the rest of
reality”
4 “the many is undoubtedly after the one, and the one precedes
plurality”
5 “every multitude close to the true one comes before every multi-
tude among those that are far from it and the other way round”59
As already noticed by G. Endress in his pioneering study,60 those
propositions clearly go back to the Arabic Procliana. The preserved
translation of 20 propositions from Proclus’ Elements of Theology61
starts off by translating the first proposition (“every plurality partici-
pates in a way in the one”) almost verbatim as we read it in the
Harmony.62 Yet, this is about as far as the verbal correspondence
goes. Proceeding with the comparison, one will find only (but as
such still pretty clear) correspondence of content: Proposition (2)
takes up the Proclean propositions 2 (“all that participates in the
one is both one and not one”) and 4 (“every unified thing is different
from the one itself”), proposition (3) parallels Proclus’ third one (“all
that becomes one, becomes one by participating in the one”) and the
fourth proposition is again almost identical with the fifth Proclean
one (“every plurality is second to the one”).63 Proposition (5) is less
easy to identify, but most probably takes up ET 62 (“every multitude
which is closer to the one is smaller than the more remote ones in
quantity, but greater in power”), which was also part of the Arabic
59 Harmony § 56 (64,7–65,17 B.).
60 Proclus arabus, p. 246, where the claim of verbal agreement of the entire first three prop-
ositions goes, however, a little too far. Dieterici refers to the Theology of Aristotle X,92–
99, where (on the basis of Plotinus, Ennead VI 7, 8,16–32) the different degrees of oneness
in the creator, the intellect and the soul are described. Although this passage displays quite
a few similarities with the five aforementioned “propositions”, it clearly neither contains all
of them (especially the first one, the only one which is accompanied by its proof in the
Harmony, is entirely absent) nor does it present the relevant thoughts in the form of
propositions.
61 Cf. Proclus, The Elements of Theology, A revised text with translation, introduction and
commentary by E.R. Dodds, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1963).
62 Endress, Proclus Arabus, p. 3: inna fī kulli kathratin al-wāh
˙
ida mawjūdun; cf. Harmony §
56 (64,16–65,1 B.): al-wāh
˙
idu mawjūdun fī kulli kathratin.
63 Cf. the Arabic wording (Endress, p. 9): inna kulla kathratin hiya ba‘da al-wāh
˙
idi, and
Harmony § 56 (65,8f): al-kathratu ba‘da al-wāh
˙
idi lā mah
˙
ālata.
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corpus.64 This proposition culminates in an interesting remark on the
relationship between body, soul, intellect and the creator:
Now it becomes clear and evident from what we have said that the corporeal
substance is larger in number than the substance of soul, and after the sub-
stance of soul there is only the intellectual substance, and the substance of
soul is larger in number than the intellectual substance, and after the intel-
lectual substance there is only the first one, i.e. the first cause, which is only
one and by no means many.65
One could suppose that it was this passage our author referred to,
when he continues after enumerating the propositions:
Then, after having established those propositions/premises, he ascends to
the statement on the parts of the world, the corporeal and the spiritual of
them, and makes sufficiently clear that all of those came to be because of a
creative act of their creator, and that he, mighty and great, is the efficient
cause, the true one, and creates all things according to what Plato has
explained in his books on theology, like the Timaeus, the Politeia and others
among the rest of his sayings.66
The Kitāb uthūlūjiyā our author had in hand, was, however,
obviously neither identical with the Theology of Aristotle we have
nowadays,67 nor with the collection of Proclean propositions published
by Endress. In the Arabic manuscript tradition, most of the
Neoplatonic metaphysical texts where authorized as derived from or
even presenting the theology of Aristotle.68 Thus, our author most
probably had in hand a manuscript containing both Arabic
Plotiniana and Procliana, presented in their entirety as Theology of
Aristotle. The references to Plato he adduces in the quotation may
thus well have been part of the text he is presenting rather than his
own addition, which would help explain not only his certainty
concerning the harmony of the two sages, but especially his unques-
tioned ascription of the concept of creatio ex nihilo to Aristotle’s
theology: This concept is entirely absent not only from the
Corpus Aristotelicum including pseudepigraphical works like the
De mundo, but also from the Arabic Plotiniana in their present
64 Endress, Proclus arabus, p. 23. The opposition of quantity and power is, just as in the
Harmony, missing here, but probably because of a lacuna in the text.
65 Proclus arabus, p. 23,10–13 (Elements of Theology, p. 58,30–32).
66 Harmony § 57 (65,10–14 B.).
67 His quotation in Harmony § 75 (74,6–15 B.), however, stems from Theology I, 21–27 resp.
Ennead IV 8, 1,1–12 (ed. Badawi, 22f).
68 Also the Proclus-manuscript published by Endress introduces the Proclean text as excerpts
of Alexander from the theology of Aristotle (cf. Proclus arabus, pp. 52–8). On the entire cor-
pus of Arabic Procliana cf. now E.Wakelnig, Feder, Tafel, Mensch. Al-ʿĀmirī’sKitāb al-Fus
˙
ūl
fī l-maʿālim al-ilāhiya und die arabische Proklos-rezeption im 10. Jh. (Leiden/Boston 2006),
pp. 48–73.
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form,69 but it was demonstrably introduced by Christian or Muslim
translators into several of the Arabic Procliana.70
What remains, is, however, the puzzling question, how our author
relates those texts to the authentic metaphysical work of Aristotle,
as his continuation is quite ambiguous:
For also in Aristotle’s ‘letters’ on metaphysics, he proceeds exclusively from
the necessary and cogent propositions to make clear the unity of the creator
(great be his honour) in the book Lambda (XII). Then he descends reverting
in a clear explication of what he had pre-established of those premises in
order to clarify them comprehensively. And this is among the things in
which no one before him had preceded him and nobody after him reached
him until our present time.71
Martini Bonadeo wants to refer this “descent” or “reversal” to the
beginning of the Theology of Aristotle.72 Yet, in my opinion, the most
natural reading for those strange two sentences would be to take
them as a summary of the books of the Metaphysics following XII,
i.e. XIII and XIV, which mainly contain Aristotle’s attack on the
Platonic theory of principles and ideal numbers. The occasion for
this attack seems to be given by the closing chapter of book XII,
where Aristotle deals with the relationship between reality and the
good or the first principle in arguing mainly for two things:
1 The good cannot be part of an original duality of principles from
which the entire reality is derived.
2 The good has to be incorporeal, like ideas and numbers, but,
unlike those, it also has to be – qua very first principle – in
any case only one.
The various criticisms of Platonic and Pythagorean doctrines con-
tained in this passage are afterwords unfolded in the two subsequent
books, in book XIII with special regard to the theory of numbers (one
and many) and in book XIV (‘reverting’ to the topic of XII,10) with
special regard to the Platonic and Pythagorean dualism. Thus, it is
in fact one of Aristotle’s core intentions in those books to prove the
priority of the one good (his unmoved mover) to every kind of original
duality of principles. Our author would then take the last three books
of Aristotle’s doubtlessly authenticMetaphysics as an endorsement of
the “presuppositions” stated in the Arabic Plotiniana and Procliana,
i.e. their complicated rejection of any dualism of principles is taken
69 According to Adamson,Arabic Plotinus, p. 145, n. 59 the only hint towards a creatio ex nihilo
in the Theology would be VIII,180, which at a closer look turns out to be just an analysis of
the eternal generation of the intellect.
70 Cf. Endress, Proclus arabus, pp. 229–33.
71 Harmony § 57 (65,14–17 B.).
72 L’armonia, 204f.
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as a proof for the strict unity of the creator. Yet, could it have entirely
escaped our author’s attention that those criticisms in Aristotle were
directed against Plato himself? Maybe this is exactly why he brings in
the possible predecessors: Aristotle stresses several times in the text
that every metaphysical attempt before him had proceeded from a
duality of principles and was thus doomed to fail (cf. e.g. XII,10
1075a25–28; XIV,1 1087a29f), yet from time to time also hints at
the possibility that those attempts might be interpreted in a correct
way congruent with his own (XII,10 1075b9f; XIII,1 1076a14–16).
Thus, perhaps we can solve the riddle of the strange statement
about possible predecessors in interpreting it as a reference to those
remarks which our author might have read as Aristotle’s tacit
acknowledgement of his teacher and predecessor Plato.
IV. CONCLUSION
After this restricted analysis of a single paragraph from the treatise
On the Harmony between the Two Sages we will return to the more
fundamental question of how such an attempt could be attributed to
al-Fārābī himself and how it relates to the way al-Fārābī’s authentic
work, first of all the tripartite Attainment of Happiness (sketching in
its second and third part the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle)73
deals with that problem. The closing statement of the first part that
both philosophers “offer one and the same philosophy” may actually,
as Rashed supposed,74 be an interpolation, as the actual descriptions
of the two philosophies have barely anything in common. In fact,
Plato’s oeuvre is limited to exploring the sociopolitical conditions for
realizing true philosophy, whereas Aristotle is depicted as actually
developing it: Starting from “a position anterior to that from which
Plato had started”,75 he provides the scientific proof for what Plato
had merely explored dialectically, i.e. the nature of human happiness
as based in thoroughly grounded theoretical and practical philosophy.
That Plato in dialogues like the Meno, Phaedo or Timaeus had also
advanced doctrinal philosophical contents, which were contradicted
by Aristotle, is just passed over with silence: The Timaeus does not
develop a natural philosophy, but only explains the distinctive
marks of the philosopher “and what ought to be his rank in this
city”.76 Plato and Aristotle are thus harmonized by consequently
73 Arabic text: Tah
˙
s
˙
īl al-saʿāda (Hyderabad, 1968); De Platonis philosophia, ed. F. Rosenthal,
R. Walzer (London, 1943; repr. Nendeln, 1973); Falsafat Arist
˙
ūt
˙
ālis, ed. M. Mahdi (Beirut,
1961). English translation: Alfarabi’s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, trans. M.Mahdi, 2nd
edn (Ithaca, 1969).
74 “On the authorship”, p. 51, n. 21.
75 Philosophy of Aristotle § 1 (tr. Mahdi, 59).
76 Philosophy of Plato § 35 (tr. Mahdi, 66).
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restricting Plato’s achievements to formal and preparatory consider-
ations about nature and role of the philosopher, whereas it is left to
Aristotle to spell out this philosophy materially.
Interestingly enough, this does not entail as much of a breach in
the hermeneutical method between al-Fārābī and the Neoplatonists
as one would expect. On the contrary, we find al-Fārābī applying
the traditional methods for harmonizing Plato with Aristotle to
the Aristotelian corpus itself, as al-Fārābī obviously conceives of
Aristotle’s system in much more Neoplatonic terms than it would be
convenient for a ‘pure Aristotelian’.77 His emanationist rearrange-
ment of Aristotle’s philosophy as structured according to the three
ontological levels of nature, soul and intellect makes him resort to a
peculiar hermeneutical approach: Rather than developping an
abstract philosophical system from Aristotle’s texts, he presents
their sequence quasi as an idealized philosophical biography, the phi-
losopher himself on his way to happiness, ascending via nature, to
soul, to intellect and from there to the vision of the first principle.
Having established his method of inquiry in the Organon,
al-Fārābī’s Aristotle first of all, throughout the Physics, inquires
nature as such without reference to higher principles, the necessity
of which and thus of an entirely different method he, however, realizes
in hinting at the unmoved mover at the end of the Physics.78
Nevertheless, his subsequent writings on natural philosophy from
the De caelo up to the zoological ones proceed in the purely physical
method. Confronted with plants and animals he realizes the insuffi-
ciency of natural principles and introduces an entirely new one, the
soul, which is said to be related to nature as form to matter.79 Thus,
he proceeds psychologically throughout the De anima and the Parva
naturalia, where he – in analogy to PhysicsVIII,10 – again anticipates
in the course of his psychological studies the necessity of introducing
yet another, even higher principle, in his treatment of dreams.80
Finally, in focussing on human psychology in particular,81 he is
again confronted with the insufficiency of ‘soul’ as explanatory prin-
ciple and “is forced”82 to posit yet another, even more fundamental
77 Pace Rashed, “On the authorship”, 53,80 e.a. al-Fārābī’s debt to the Neoplatonists is com-
prehensively argued for (yet in considering the Harmony as authentic) by P. Vallat,
Fārābī et l’école d’Alexandrie. Des prémisses de la connaissance à la philosophie politique
(Paris, 2004).
78 Philosophy of Aristotle § 34 (tr. Mahdi, 103).
79 Philosophy of Aristotle § 74 (tr. Mahdi, 115f).
80 Philosophy of Aristotle § 87 (tr. Mahdi, 121) cf. ibid. 34 (tr. Mahdi, 103).
81 At this point, al-Fārābī obviously neglects the sequence of Aristotle’s psychological writings,
which of course treat human psychology from the very beginning, for the sake of his scheme
of presentation.
82 Philosophy of Aristotle § 90 (ed. Mahdi, 122,8f). The motive of Aristotle “being forced” (cf.
also e.g. § 61) by the phenomena underlines the “quasi-biographical” or inductive character
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principle: the intellect. Yet, in examining the soul from this new
perspective, it turns out that its potential intellect can only be
brought to actual intellection of an intellectual form by an active
principle always actually containing those forms, the so-called
active intellect, with which the soul has to be united, in order to
actually grasp intellectual contents.
At this point Aristotle returned once again to investigate those matters that
had escaped him, in many of which he now detected the causes of the difficul-
ties. Then he investigated, whether the Active Intellect is also the cause of
the existence of nature and natural things and of the soul and animate
things.83
As the subsequent exposition shows, this ‘reversion’ for al-Fārābī
means more than a simple appendix to De anima III, 4–5 adding to
the epistemological functions of the active Intellect his different
creative powers. Rather it entails a retractatio of almost the entire
natural philosophy from a completely different angle: As natural
philosophy finally transcends itself in having to postulate a trans-
cendent principle in order to explain the noblest act of the noblest
natural being, the intellectual knowledge of man, it turns out in
the end that a theory of nature can only be complete and fully
correct within the framework of a metaphysical exposition of nat-
ure’s intellectual causes.84 The hermeneutical potential of this
view is just as obvious as its provenance: Especially the treatment
of the Categories, in particular the concept of substance,85 reveals
that al-Fārābī continues the Neoplatonic tradition of limitating
the Aristotelian logic and physics to the sublunar world.86 He
wants to assign every problematic Aristotelian statement to a
different stage on Aristotle’s way to knowledge and thus eliminate
almost all the tensions not only within the corpus itself but also
between some of its texts and its Neoplatonizing reception, i.e., as
the author of the Harmony puts it, assign to every Aristotelian
claim “the place where it is found, its rank and the discipline
from which it comes”.87 This way, al-Fārābī proves himself an
independent and original reader of Aristotle, yet also clearly
of al-Fārābī’s presentation, just as the repeated labelling of some of Aristotle’s findings as
merely provisional (cf. §§ 20, 66, 68, 78, 97).
83 Mahdi, Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, p. 128.
84 This probably amounts to the ‘deductive Physics’ al-Fārābī misses in Aristotle (cf. Rashed,
“Al-Fārābī’s lost treatise On Changing Beings”, pp. 37–44).
85 Philosophy of Aristotle § 4 (tr. Mahdi, 82f) cf. §§ 17f (tr. Mahdi, 93–6).
86 Cf. esp. ibid., 129 (following a tradition finally going back to Plotinus,EnneadVI 3, on which
text cf. R. Thiel, Aristoteles’ Kategorienschrift in ihrer antiken Kommentierung [Tübingen,
2004]).
87 Harmony § 45 (58,3f B.).
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indebted to the late-antique Neoplatonic commentators and their
contemporary Arabic disciples, like the author of the Harmony, if
it is actually inauthentic. After all, after the preceeding study,
one might be inclined to ask whether the presented hermeneutical
model would not be flexible enough to make many of the differences
between the Harmony and the rest of the Farabian corpus, which
were put forward to question the former’s authenticity, seem less
irreconcilable.*
* This article is the revised version of a paper to be presented at the University of Isfahan in
April 2010. For many valuable comments regarding its improvement I would like to thank
the reviewer of ASP.
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APPENDIX: THERECEPTIONOFAMMONIUS’TREATISEON
EFFICIENT AND FINAL CAUSE IN ARISTOTLE IN THE
HARMONY.
Al-Fārābī, Jamʿ § 56
(ed. D. Mallet, F. Najjar
[Damascus, 1999], p. 131 /
ed. C. Martini Bonadeo [Pisa,
2008], p. 64,10–16)
Simplikios, In Phys. VIII,10 267b17–26
(CAG X)
wa-qad bayyana ayd
˙
an fī
al-samāʾi al-t
˙
abīʿiyyi anna
al-kulla lā yumkinu an yakūna
h
˙
udūthuhu bi-al-bakhti
wa-al-ittifāqi wa-ka-dhālika fī
al-samāʾi wa-al-ʿālami.
And he clarifies also in the
lecture on Physics that the
universe can impossibly have
come into being by chance and
coincidence, just as he does in
‘On heaven and earth’.
And in the first book of On heaven he
claims that neither God nor nature do
anything in vain. (1361,19f)
Yet, also in the second book of the lecture
on Physics he calls chance and
coincidence accidental causes
supervening the ones efficient per se,
i.e. intellect and nature, and adds: ‘[. . .] no
matter to what degree coincidence is the
cause of this universe, intellect and
nature are necessarily causes to a higher,
primary degree, both of many other
things and of this universe”. (1362,20–30)
wa-yastadillu ʿalā dhālika
bi-al-niz
˙
āmi al-badīʿi alladhī
yūjadu li-ajzāʾi al-ʿālami
ba‘d
˙
ihā maʿa baʿd
˙
in.
And this he infers from the
admirable order to be found in
the parts of the universe
amongst each other.
In book I of the Metaphyscis [. . .], he
writes: ‘Someone [i.e. Anaxagoras] who
claimed the intellect to inhere, just as in
animals, also in nature while being the
cause of the cosmos and the entire order
appeared as widely awake in comparison
to the futile babblers before him’. [. . .] He
thus praises those who rank the intellect
as final and efficient cause, just as he
shortly before praised Anaxagoras,
because the latter had kept the intellect
unaffected and unmixed in calling it
principle of movement.
(1361,33–1362,10)
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wa-qad bayyana hunāka amra
al-ʿilali wa-kam hiya
wa-athbata al-ʿillata al-fāʿila.
And there he made clear the
issue of causes, both how many
there are and insofar as he
affirms the efficient cause.
Nobody doubts that Aristotle called God
final cause or primary mover. Yet, that
he also called him efficient cause, is, in
my opinion, sufficiently proved by the
fact that in the classification of causes in
the second book of the lecture on Physics
he calls the efficient cause ‘where the
principle of movement comes from’:
‘Furthermore is that (a cause) where the
first beginning of change or rest comes
from, e.g. the man who gave the advice to
do something is a cause, the father is
cause of the child, and generally what
makes of what is made.’ How then could
it have been put more clearly in order to
show that the first mover is an efficient
cause? (1361,11–18)
wa-qad bayyana ayd
˙
an hunāka
amra al-mukawwini
wa-al-muh
˙
arriki
wa-annahu ghayru
al-mukawwani
wa-al-mutah
˙
arraki,
And there he also clarified the
issue of the generator and
mover, and that it differs from
the entity generated and
moved,
And that the term ‘becoming’ in Plato
and the term ‘movement’ in Aristotle
both mean ‘change’, can easily be
understood from the fact that Plato
distinguishes the becoming entity qua
changing entity from the one behaving
always identically, whereas Aristotle,
when he claims every moved entity to be
moved by something else, does not only
talk about properly moved things, but
also about things coming to be and
passing away and changing ones in
general. Thus, he often called the
unmovable unchangeable, as it not only
transcends movement properly
speaking, but also coming to be and
passing away. (1359,30–38)
One has to pay attention to the fact that
an entity moved by something else
necessarily also has its existence from
elsewhere, as substance is more than
movement. Yet, if according to Aristotle
the power of every limited body is also
limited, obviously both the one to move
and the one to sustain its own substance,
this body necessarily receives, just as it
has the eternal movement from an
unmoved cause, also the eternal
corporeal substance from an incorporeal
cause. (1363,2–8)
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wa-kamā anna Aflat
˙
ūna fī
kitābihi al-maʿrūfi
bi-t
˙
īmāwusi bayyana anna
kulla mukawwani innamā
yatakawwanu ʿan ʿillatin
mukawwinatin lahu id
˙
t
˙
irāran
wa-anna al-mukawwana lā
yakūnu ʿillatan li-kawni
dhātihi.
just as Plato explains in his
book known as Timaeus that
everything generated
necessarily is generated
thanks to a cause which
generates it, and that the
generated thing is not cause
of its own generation.
Plato found the creator of the cosmos, the
intellective god, in proceeding from the
substance of the mundane body itself. In
distinguishing therefore the true being
from becoming, [. . .] he ranks the entire
corporeal substance as generated and
having its being in becoming and being
therefore – as incapable of
self-generation – dependent upon a
cause: ‘For it is impossible’, he says, ‘for
any kind of entity to come into being
without a cause’. [. . .] Hence, he
discovered the creator of the cosmos as a
really existing intellective god, who
behaves always identically as
established in the Aeon, by proceeding
from the changeable substance of the
cosmos up to the unchangeable cause.
However, also Aristotle ascended from
movement and change and the extended
and limited existence of bodies up to the
unmoved, unchangeable and unextended
cause. (1359,8–26)
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